The Russian Federation vetoes (a). Now Ukraine and Odesa will have to hold an internal vote by veto to choose one of the three remaining options. Representatives of the state of Ukraine decided not to veto option (d), but do not talk about it. Let's define the voters as follows: u₁ - Russian Federation; u₂ - Ukraine; u₃ - Odesa. Here is a diagram of the possible outcomes of the vote:

Here are the preferences of the voters (players):

u₂(c) < u₂(d) < u₂(b),

u₃(c) < u₃(b) < u₃(d).

Consider two such voting outcomes: (not c, L) and (not b, L). In (not c, L) and (not b, L) player 2 vetoes c and b, while player 3 uses the following strategy L:

go right if player 2 vetoes c and b,

go left if player 2 vetoes d.

Are (not c, L) and (not b, L) equilibria (outcomes suitable for both Ukraine and Odesa)?